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Abstract
This paper provides an ‘escape route’ from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the
School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of
fairness, called τ -fairness, which is always satisfied by some allocation.
Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange
mechanism, a procedure that assigns a τ -fair allocation to each problem.
We further identify a condition on students’ preferences guaranteeing incentive
compatibility of this mechanism.
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1. Introduction
In July 2005, Boston public schools adopted the Student Optimal Stable mecha-
nism as a procedure to distribute the scholar places among the newcomer students.
This reform is in the origin of a prolix literature on School Choice. The two main
reasons encouraging the Boston School Committee to shift the allocation mecha-
nism were its equitable treatment of students and the strategic properties satisfied
by the newly adopted procedure, which are not satisfied by the formerly applied.
Unfortunately, the Student Optimal Stable mechanism (SOSM henceforth) fails
to select efficient allocations. This lack has motivated an intensive research by
several authors to conciliate the three properties, namely efficiency, equity and
non-manipulability.
The present paper takes a close look at the these incompatibilities and pro-
vides a positive solution to this problem. We identify and characterize a solution
that reconciles efficiency and equity in School Choice problems. The allocations
meeting such a requirement will be called τ -fair. We then introduce a mecha-
nism selecting one τ -fair allocation. Moreover we identify a class of problems
under which this mechanism is strategy-proof: the set of problems satisfying the
β-condition.
The analysis of how social conflicts should be solved has generated a vast lit-
erature providing a huge number of ‘impossibility results’ showing the incompati-
bility of some desirable properties. For instance, de Condorcet (1785) pointed out
that majority voting might induce cyclic social preferences; Gibbard (1973) and
Satterthwaite (1975) proved that non-trivial mechanisms selecting efficient allo-
cations are manipulable; or Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) provided two examples
suggesting that the goals of efficiency and fairness may be mutually incompatible.
As a reaction to the negative findings, some authors either concentrate on the anal-
ysis of ‘reasonable frameworks’ where such an incompatibility is escaped or ex-
plore alternative solutions avoiding the trade-off. Related to the examples above,
Black (1948) introduced the notion of single-peakedness as a condition guarantee-
ing the transitivity of the majority voting schemes; Moulin (1980) characterizes
the set of efficient, non-manipulable voting schemes when agents’ preferences
fulfill single peakedness; or Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) introduce ‘Egalitarian
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Equivalence’ as an equity criterion which is compatible with efficiency.
Our first concern is related to the trade-off between efficiency and equity.
Balinski and Sönmez (1999) introduced an equity criterion for the School Choice
framework which might unfulfilled by all the efficient allocations. Equity is very
related to the conception of fairness introduced by Foley (1967), and establishes a
strong condition to be satisfied by an allocation to be branded as ‘unambiguously
equitable’. Our approach is closer to the notion of resentment (see Rawls, 1971,
pg. 533) in the sense that “those who express resentment must be prepared to
show why certain institutions are unjust . . . ” This argument allows to determine
that an allocation is λ-equitable whenever no agent claiming to have suffered an
injustice is able to propose an alternative allocation that no one else would declare
to be inequitable. Since the set of λ-equitable allocations is larger than that of
the equitable ones, we can find efficient allocations fulfilling this weaker equity
requirement.
The analysis of τ -fairness, as the confluence of efficiency and λ-equity, yields
to identify these allocations as the ones combining the two conditions that have
worried some researchers. On the one hand, τ -fair allocations are efficient and,
on the other hand, no student prefers her allocation under the SOSM to the school
she is assigned to.
The existence of a fairness concept overcoming the incompatibility of effi-
ciency and equity allows to inquiry about the existence of mechanisms selecting
τ -fair allocations. When designing such mechanisms we concentrate on fitting
two particular restrictions. First, the allocation procedure must be easy-to-be-
adopted. Note that there is a large tradition pointing out that societies use to be
reluctant to deep reforms.1 Therefore, the adoption of the new mechanism should
not introduce extreme changes on the existing one. We reach this objective by con-
sidering a folk modification into the SOSM. Provided that the allocation proposed
by the SOSM might fail to be efficient, we might consider it as an ‘exchangeable’
initial endowment. Students are then allowed to switch their assigned places. As a
1An illustrative example of this fact was explained by Al Roth in the 2007 Rosenthal Memorial
Lecture, held in Boston University, when explaining why the Top Trading Cycles mechanism
(See Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez, 2003, Section II.B) was not adopted by the Boston School
Committee. A video of this lecture is available at http://www.bu.edu/buniverse/view/?v=grOprKV,
accessed on April 2nd, 2014.
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consequence of students’ interaction, this ‘pure exchange market for places’ helps
to restore efficiency, whereas λ-equity is not lost. These two facts guarantee the
τ -fairness of the final assignment. The second limitation we concentrate on is
the absence of students’ incentives to exhibit a strategic behavior.2 Our approach
to this concern is conditioned by the fact that τ -fairness and strategy-proofness
are incompatible in the School Choice context. To reach positive results we pro-
ceed by studying how τ -fair mechanisms for School Choice problems behave in
restricted domains, from an incentive-compatibility perspective. In particular, we
explore the existence of reasonable frameworks where such an incompatibility can
be avoided, and we identify a condition, to be named β-Condition, whose fulfill-
ment by the students’ sets of preferences yields the existence of strategy-proof,
τ -fair mechanisms.
Outline of the Paper
We conclude this section by providing an overview of the remainder of the
paper. Section 2 connects our analysis with the existing literature. Section 3 in-
troduces the basic model as well as one of the main contributions of this paper.
In particular, we provide a formal definition of τ -fairness and, in Theorem 9, we
prove the existence of at least one τ -fair allocation for each School Choice prob-
lem. We conclude this section by characterizing the set of τ -fair allocations. Sec-
tion 4 formally introduces the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange mecha-
nism, which selects a τ -fair allocation for each problem. Therefore, Section 4 can
be regarded as a formal proof of Theorem 9. We explore strategic issues related
to the application of this mechanism in Section 5. Finally, our main conclusions
are provided in Section 6. For exposition simplicity, we relegate some technical
proofs to the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) introduced the School Choice model inspired
in the far-reaching literature on Matching models. Their analysis is closely related
to Balinski and Sönmez (1999) because the former adopts the notion of equity
2As Roth points out in the above-mentioned lecture, strategy-proofness is a relevant aspect
when designing allocation mechanisms in the School Choice framework.
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introduced by the latter. In particular, Balinski and Sönmez (1999) reinterpret the
classical notion of stability in Matching models in terms of equity in the School
Choice framework. These authors argue that stability embodies the equity of an
allocation because it eliminates any justifiable envy and avoids wastefulness.
The School Choice model assumes that each school prioritizes the new stu-
dents according some given exogenous factors.3 Schools’ priorities are employed
to discern whether an allocation is equitable or not, so that any distribution of
places in which priorities are not preserved is said inequitable. The close-knit
relationship between equity of an allocation and stability of the matching it de-
scribes entails a series of well-known facts. Among them, it is relevant to mention
the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and equity, as pointed out in Roth
(1982).
The general non-existence of fair allocations, i.e. equitable and efficient as-
signments, has been a central issue in the analysis of mechanisms for School
Choice problems. As Abdulkadirog˘lu (2013) reports, in the context of School
Choice efficiency is a primary objective. This is why some authors concentrate
on alternative approaches to reconcile efficiency and equity. For instance, Ergin
(2002) and Ehlers and Erdil (2010) study when the SOSM provides fair alloca-
tions. These authors identify a condition on the priorities profiles, named acyclic-
ity, which is not only necessary but also sufficient to guarantee that the SOSM al-
location is fair for any preferences exhibited by the students. Alternatively, Kesten
(2010) designs a mechanism that eliminates the efficiency loss obtained when ap-
plying the SOSM. This author reaches his objective by allowing students to forgo
priorities that, being relevant to them, are critical to others. This procedure, named
‘the Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism’ (EADAM hereafter),
is designed to select efficient allocations, Pareto dominating the SOSM outcome,
when the former is not efficient.
3Among these factors, the most relevant ones are the distance between the school and the
students’ residences and the fact that the students have a sibling attending that school or not. In
order to break ties, a fair lottery is implemented.
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A. School Choice and Co-operative Game Theory
There is a close relationship between the literature in School Choice and the anal-
ysis of Matching problems. The latter class of models has been extensively ex-
plored from a (co-operative) game-theoretical perspective. Within this framework,
the absence of (strong) compromise solutions (v.g. core allocations) has been at
the origin of the analysis of solutions supported by stability notions involving a
weaker compromise from the agents’ perspective. In particular, we want to stress
that there is a large tradition on exploring different notions of bargaining sets (see,
e.g., Aumann and Maschler, 1964; Zhou, 1994) in which agents’ ability to object a
given allocation is more restrictive than the blocking notion applied when defining
the core of a cooperative game (Gillies, 1959), or the equivalent notion of stability
in Matching models (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Following this approach of re-
stricting the students’ ability to claim inequitable treatments we suggests to adopt
λ-equity as a weak notion of equity and then demonstrate that it is compatible
with efficiency of an allocation (Theorem 9).
B. Pareto-Improving the SOSM
The absence of fair allocations motivated the analysis of mechanisms selecting
efficient assignments. Following this line of reasoning, Erdil and Ergin (2008),
Pápai (2010) and Azevedo and Leshno (2011) explore natural mechanisms con-
sisting in applying the Gale’s Top Trading Cycle (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to the
allocation obtained when applying the SOSM.4 Let us note that, as argued in the
Introduction, it is expected that such mechanisms select τ -fair allocations. It is
also remarkable, from a practical applicability perspective, that the New House
4 at MIT applies a similar mechanism to distribute its available dorms among
its residents.5 Nevertheless, these mechanisms have not received recognition in
the literature. The main reason is that they are manipulable (see Kesten, 2010,
4Since each school might have several places, when applying the Top Trading Cycle each
student will be indifferent on exchanging with any of the students having a place at the same
school. In order to avoid such indifferences, an exogenous tie-breaking rule is selected. Note that
we can describe a family of mechanisms by associating one mechanism to each given tie-breaking
rule.
5A detailed description of the procedure employed by NH4 can be found on its web page
http://scripts.mit.edu/∼nh4/housingrules.php, accessed on April 4, 2014.
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Proposition 4), and strategy-proofness is considered by several authors a ‘must be
satisfied’ property by any mechanism for School Choice problems.
Nevertheless, in practice, Kesten’s manipulability result might not hold, as
agents’ preferences over schools exhibit some specificity. In this respect, Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011) report: “Families tend to value similar qualities about
schools (e.g., safety, academic reputation, etc.), which causes them to have similar
ordinal preferences. Indeed, the Boston public schools data exhibit strong corre-
lation in students’ preferences over schools.” Therefore, these authors suggest
that it might be plausible to restrict students’ declared preferences to fulfill certain
specific properties.
We investigate the conditions avoiding, when satisfied by the admissible sets
of student’s preferences, Kesten’s impossibility result. To be precise, we con-
centrate in a mechanism named the ‘Student Optimal Compensating Exchange’
that can be described as the application of the Top Trading Cycle to the SOSM
allocation. Our approach parallels that of Alcalde and Barberà (1994) for Match-
ing models. We study conditions on students’ preferences guaranteeing that no
student benefits from misrepresenting her preferences when the Student Optimal
Compensating Exchange mechanism is adopted. To this concern we demonstrate
that when the sets preferences satisfy the β-Condition, our mechanism is strategy-
proof. Interesting enough, the β-Condition allows situations in which the strong
correlation in the students’ preferences asserted by Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011)
is present while SOSM allocation remains inefficient. This condition can be ex-
pressed as follows. Let us consider any three schools and two admissible pref-
erences for a given student. Then we require that the two preferences, when re-
stricted to these schools, either locate the same school as the worst one or coincide
in which is the median school.
3. Fairness and the School Choice Problem
Let us consider two non-empty, disjoint sets to be termed the students’ and the
schools’ sets. The set of students has n individuals and is denoted S = {si}ni=1.
The set of schools, which is denoted C = {cj}mj=1, has m elements. Each school
is endowed a given capacity, which determines the maximum number of places to
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be distributed among the students. Let qj ≥ 1 denote the capacity of school cj ,
and let q = (q1, . . . , qj, . . . , qm) denote the vector summarizing the capacities of
the schools.
Each school prioritizes the students according a linear ordering. Let Pj be
ordering describing how school cj prioritized its potential applicants, and let P =
(P1, . . . , Pj, . . . , Pm) be the vector summarizing these priorities, which will be
called a priorities profile.
Similarly, each student has linear preferences over the set of schools. There-
fore, no student will consider two different schools equivalent. Let i denote si’
preferences. For notational convenience, we denote si’ weak preferences as %i.
Thus, cj %i ch will be understood as cj i ch whenever cj 6= ch. We also extend
students’ preferences to ensure that all schools are considered acceptable and the
‘not having any school place’ is the students’ worst option. We denote it by stating
that, for each student si and school cj , cj i si. Vector= (1, . . . ,i, . . . ,n)
is called a preferences profile.
Therefore, a School Choice problem, also called a Problem, can be described
by listing the elements above [(S;) ; (C; q;P )]. As the set of students, colleges
and quotas will remain fixed in what follows, we will designate each Problem as
(;P ) or P .
A solution to P is an application µ that matches students and places observing
schools’ capacities. Such a correspondence is called a matching. Formally,
Definition 1 A matching for P is a correspondence µ, applying S ∪ C to itself
such that:
1. For each si in S, if µ (si) 6= si, then µ (si) ∈ C.
2. For each cj in C, µ (cj) ⊆ S and |µ (cj)| ≤ qj .6
3. For each si in S and any cj in C, µ (si) = cj if and only if si ∈ µ (cj).
An efficient assignment denotes the situation in which no re-allocation is
weakly preferred by the students, as we describe below.
6Throughout this paper, |T | will denote the cardinality of set T .
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Definition 2 Given a Problem (;P ), we say that matching µ is efficient if for
any other matching µ′ 6= µ, there is a student, si, such that
µ (si) i µ′ (si) .
We now concentrate on two notions of equity. The first one is the classical
notion of equity in the context of School Choice whereas the second one is the
weak equity we call λ-equity. Definition 6 formalizes the two equity notions,
which are illustrated through the next example.
Example 3 There are three students and three schools, having a vacant each.
Therefore, S = {1, 2, 3} and C = {a, b, c}. Let us assume that the preferences
and priorities are
a 1 c 1 b,
c 2 a 2 b,
c 3 a 3 b,
3 Pa 2 Pa 1,
2 Pb 1 Pb 3,
1 Pc 3 Pc 2.
Let us consider matching µ described as
µ :=
1 2 3
a b c
It is easy to see that student 2 can adduce that µ fails to be equitable because
she has priority over student 1 for school a. A way to formalize such a ‘complaint’
is by proposing matching µ′ described as
µ′ :=
1 2 3
b a c
In such a case we say that student 2 objects against matching µ via µ′, or equiv-
alently that the pair (2, µ′) constitutes a fair objection against µ. Is the presence
of such an objection what allows to say that µ is inequitable.
Now, let us consider that student 2’s objection is taken into account and match-
ing µ′ is implemented. Applying a similar reasoning, we can see that student 1
can object against µ′ via µ′′ described as
8
µ′′ :=
1 2 3
c a b
In such a case we say that student 1 counter-objects student 2’s objection. The
fact that a fair objection is counter-objected allows to disregard it. The essence of
λ-equity is the absence of fair objections that cannot be counter-objected.
Definition 4 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem, and let µ be a matching for P . A fair
objection from student si to µ is a pair (si, µ′) such that
i) µ′ (si) i µ (si), and
ii) |µ (cj)| < qj , or si Pj sh for some sh ∈ µ (cj), with cj = µ′ (si).
Definition 5 Let (si, µ′) be a fair objection to matching µ. A counter-objection
from student sk to (si, µ′) is a pair (sk, µ′′) that constitutes a fair objection to
matching µ′.
We say that (si, µ′) is a justified, fair objection to µ if it cannot be counter objected.
Definition 6 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. We say that matching µ is
(a) equitable if there is no (si, µ′) constituting a fair objection against µ; and
(b) λ-equitable if there is no (si, µ′) which constitutes a justified, fair objection
against µ.
Note that for a given School Choice problem, any equitable allocation is also
λ-equitable. Therefore, the set of λ-equitable matchings also contains all equitable
allocations. Thus, as the set of equitable allocations is always non-empty (see,
v.g., Gale and Shapley, 1962, Theorem 1), the next statement follows.
Proposition 7 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. Then, P has, at least, one λ-
equitable matching.
The solution concept that we propose in this section, τ -fairness, combines two
central solutions for School Choice problems, namely efficiency and λ-equity.
Definition 8 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. We say that matching µ is
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(a) fair if it is efficient and equitable; and
(b) τ -fair if it is efficient and λ-equitable.
Let F (P) denote the set of fair matchings for problem P .
The next question that we address is the existence of τ -fair allocations. Al-
though the sets of equitable and efficient matchings might not intersect, when we
focus on λ-equitable allocations rather than equitable ones, such an intersection is
always non-empty.
Theorem 9 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. Then, its set of τ -fair allocations is
non-empty.
Since Theorem 9 can be considered a corollary of Theorem 17, its proof is
omitted.
A further question of particular relevance is the possibility of characterizing
the set of τ -fair allocations. Theorem 11, whose proof is reported in the Appendix
A, reports that the only efficient allocations that are λ-equitable are those Pareto
dominating the matching proposed by the SOSM.
Previous to introduce the following result, and for the sake of completeness,
we need to introduce the Student Optimal mechanism, which is obtained by com-
puting the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Definition 10 Let (;P ) be a School Choice problem; we define its Student Op-
timal Stable matching, µSO, as the outcome of the following algorithm.
Step 1. Each student, si, applies to the school that is ranked first after i. Each
school, cj , tentatively accepts up to qj students, according its priority list.
The remaining applications (if any) are rejected.
. . .
Step k. Each student, si, applies to the first school after i (if any) that has not
previously rejected her. If the student has been rejected by all schools, she is
unassigned. Each school, cj , tentatively accepts up to qj students, according
its priority list. Any remaining application is rejected.
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The algorithm ends when each student who remains unassigned has been rejected
by all schools. Each student is assigned to the school (if any) that accepted her
application in the last step.
Theorem 11 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. µ is τ -fair for P if and only if
i) µ is efficient, and
ii) for each student, si,
µ (si) %i µSO (si;P) .
Note that Theorem 11 has some straightforward implications. The first one,
which is the aim of Corollary 12, establishes that the Student Optimal Stable
matching is the unique allocation (if any) combining both equity and efficiency.
The second consequence is reflected in Corollary 13: it is not worthwhile to dis-
tinguish between allocative fairness and τ -fairness when the former concept is
non-empty.
Corollary 12 F (P) ⊆ {µSO (P)} for each problem P = (;P ).
Corollary 13 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. If its Student Optimal Stable match-
ing is efficient, then any τ -fair matching is a fair allocation.
4. From Equity to τ -Fairness: The SOCE Mechanism
This section is devoted to the analysis of School Choice mechanisms, i.e. proce-
dures assigning a matching to each School Choice problem. As it is usual in the
literature, the properties defined for specific solutions are straightforwardly trans-
lated to mechanisms. In particular, a mechanismM is efficient (resp. equitable,
λ-equitable, fair or τ -fair) if for each School Choice problem P , matchingM (P)
is efficient (equitable, λ-equitable, fair or τ -fair resp.) with respect to Problem P .
To be precise, we concentrate on introducing the Student Optimal Compen-
sating Exchange mechanism, SOCE in short, a mechanism for School Choice
problems that always selects a τ -fair allocation.
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A simple way to describe the SOCE is by the (sequential) combination of two
well-known allocation procedures. The first, the input of which is a School Choice
problem, is the SOSM. Once the SOSM is applied, we can consider the Housing
Market (see Shapley and Scarf, 1974), in which the students are the agents, and
each individual is initially endowed with the place that the SOSM assigned to
her. We can then apply Gale’s Tops Trading Cycle, introduced by Shapley and
Scarf (1974), to achieve a Pareto improvement relative to the initial outcome of
the SOSM. Theorem 17 indicates that the outcome of this iterative procedure is
always a τ -fair matching.
Therefore, the SOCE can be regarded as a tool to develop a constructive proof
of Theorem 9, or alternatively, as a suggestion for improving the system adopted
by the Boston School Committee in 2005 (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006) by
guaranteeing allocative efficiency.
Definition 10 described how to compute, for a given Problem P , the Student
Optimal Stable matching, µSO (P). Therefore, to complete a formal definition
of the SOCE, we need to describe how the Tops Trading Cycle operates. This is
the aim of Definition 15. Appendix B is devoted to illustrate how to compute the
SOCE for a specific Problem.
The Housing Market framework, introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), in-
volves a set of agents owning one indivisible object each. Agents exhibit prefer-
ences over the objects, which will be described through a linear preorder. Follow-
ing this structure, we assign to each School Choice problem, P , and matching, µ,
a Housing problem. In this transition from a School Choice problem and alloca-
tion, µ, to a problem reflecting the structure of a Housing Market, there are some
specifications that are (or can be considered) natural.
In our placing market, student si reveals that she wishes to trade with sh when-
ever she prefers sh’s place to her own. Let linear preorder Ei denote student si’s
preferences for exchange.7 The following can be assumed.
(a) Student si only wishes to exchange her place with sh if she benefits from
7Let us recall that, as argued in the Introduction, the role of Ei is just to specify a tie-breaking
rule. See footnote 4.
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such an exchange,
sh Ei si ⇒ µ (sh) i µ (si) .
(b) For any two students, sh and sk, who have been assigned different schools,
any other student, si, prefers to exchange with the student who has a place
in her preferred school,
µ (sh) i µ (sk)⇒ sh Ei sk.
Nevertheless, there is no a priori justification to determine how to order two differ-
ent students who have been assigned a place in the same school. When describing
a compensating market for school places, we assume that each student prefers to
exchange with the individual having the lowest priority for a given school. The
rationale of such a hypothesis derives from the manner in which priorities are es-
tablished in real-life situations. When developing a priority list, schools divide
students into categories, primarily based on two factors, namely siblings and res-
idence. Under this method of classifying students, the school prioritizes several
students equally at this stage. Lotteries are used to break these ties. Therefore, in
most cases, it is expected that the school prioritizes one student relative to another
because of some random factor. The Student Optimal Compensating Market’s
feature of reversing the priority lists is intended to compensate for the random
effect introduced by the lottery.8
Definition 14 Let P be a School Choice problem. We define its associated Stu-
dent Optimal Compensating Market, SOCM (P), as the pair
(
Sˆ, E
)
, where
(1) The set of agents is described as,
Sˆ =
{
si ∈ S : µSO (si;P) ∈ C
}
, and
8Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2011) explore a family of student optimal placing markets,
including the SOCM, each of which yields a τ -fair allocation. In the present paper and for the
sake of simplicity, we concentrate on the SOCM.
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(2) the profile of preferences for exchange, E = (Ei)si∈Sˆ , is described such that
for each si ∈ Sˆ, Ei is a linear preorder on Sˆ satisfying
(a) for each sh ∈ Sˆ such that µSO (si;P) %i µSO (sh;P), si Ei sh;
(b) for each sh, sk ∈ Sˆ such that µSO (sh;P) i µSO (sk;P), sh Ei sk;
and
(c) for any sh, sk ∈ Sˆ such that µSO (sh;P) = µSO (sk;P) 6= µSO (si;P),
sh Ei sk if and only if sk Pj sh.
In a more general context, a Placing Market is a pair,
(
S˜, E
)
, where S˜ is a set
of agents and E denotes the profile of their preferences for exchange (i.e., for each
si in S˜, Ei is a linear preorder on S˜).
Definition 15 We define the Tops Trading Cycle rule as the procedure for assign-
ing to each Placing Market, (S, E), the outcome of the following algorithm.
Step 1. Let us consider the digraph whose set of nodes is S, and there is an arc from
si to sh if sh is the maximal for Ei in S. This digraph has at least one cycle.
Let K (S) be the set of students belonging to some cycle. Then, match each
student in K (S) to her preferred “mate for exchanging”; i.e., if si ∈ K (S),
then TTC (si; (S, E)) = sh whenever sh is the maximal for Ei in S.
Let us define S2 = S \K (S). If S2 is empty, the algorithm stops. Other-
wise, go to Step 2.
. . .
Step t. Let us consider the digraph whose set of nodes is St, and there is an arc
connecting si to sh if sh is the maximal for Ei in St. This digraph has at
least one cycle. Let K (St) be the set of students belonging to some cycle.
Then, match each student inK (St) to her preferred “mate for exchanging”;
in other words, if si ∈ K (St), then TTC (si; (S, E)) = sh whenever sh is
the maximal for Ei in St.
Let us define St+1 = St \ K (St). If St+1 is empty, the algorithm stops.
Otherwise, go to Step (t+ 1).
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Because the number of students is finite, and for each t, it holds that St+1 ( St,
this algorithm stops in a finite number of steps.
We can now provide a formal definition of the Student Optimal Compensat-
ing Exchange mechanism, which can be straightforwardly introduced by the next
sequential procedure.
(1) Given a School Choice problem, say P = (;P ), let us compute its Stu-
dent Optimal Stable matching, µSO (P). Once this is complete, we can
distinguish two groups of students:
i) The unassigned students, namely
{
si ∈ S : µSO (si;P) = si
}
; and
ii) The assigned or ‘placed’ students, namely
{
si ∈ S : µSO (si;P) ∈ C
}
.
(2) Let us apply the Tops Trading Cycle rule to SOCM (P). Let us observe
that in this phase the only students that might participate, and thus improve
with respect to µSO (P), are the placed ones.
Definition 16 We define the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange mecha-
nism as the matching rule assigning each Problem, say P = (;P ), the matching
µce (P) described as follows
µce (si;P) =
{
si if µSO (si;P) = si
µSO (TTC (SOCM (P)) ;P) otherwise .
As the next result indicates, for each problem (;P ) its SOCE allocation is a
τ -fair allocation.
Theorem 17 Let P = (;P ) be a Problem. Its Student Optimal Compensating
Exchange matching, µce (P), is a τ -fair allocation for such a problem.
A formal proof of this result can be found in Appendix C. We next provide a
heuristic explanation justifying why our result holds.
First, let us note that, when considering a given problem, P , for each student
si and equitable matching µ,
µSO (si;P) %i µ (si) ;
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i.e., µSO (P) is (constrained) efficient when restricted to the set of equitable allo-
cations.
Second, for each Problem, P = (;P ), µce (P) is an efficient matching that
Pareto-dominates µSO (P), unless the two matchings coincide.
The two observations above and the fact that µSO (P) is equitable are crucial
to concluding that µce (P) is τ -fair.
5. Strategic Behavior and the SOCE
A central issue when designing mechanisms for School Choice problems is to
guarantee that students are safe when expressing their preferences honestly. This
is the essence of strategy-proofness, as we describe in Definition 19.
Let us introduce some formalisms. Given a Problem, P = (;P ), let us
assume that some student, say si, announces that her preferences are′i instead of
i. Let P ′ = ((′i,−i) ;P ) denote the Problem in which student si’ preferences
have been misrepresented.
We also adopt the following traditional convention. Given a mechanismM, a
School Choice problem P , and x ∈ S ∪ C, we denoteM (x;P) = µ (x), where
µ ≡M (P).
Definition 18 We say that student si manipulates School Choice mechanismM
at P via preferences ′i if
M (si;P ′) iM (si;P) .
A mechanism that cannot be manipulated is strategy-proof.
Definition 19 We say that School Choice mechanismM is strategy-proof if for
each Problem, P = (;P ), student si and preferences for si, say ′i,
M (si;P) %iM (si;P ′) .
The SOCE is a combination of two strategy-proof mechanisms. First, we use
the SOSM; then, we apply the TTC. However, the impossibility of finding an
efficient and strategy-proof mechanism Pareto-dominating the SOSM (see, e.g.,
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Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009 or Kesten, 2010) implies that the SOCE is manipula-
ble.
A way to escape the above negative results is by proposing mild conditions
on students’ characteristics that prevent them from engaging in strategic behavior.
Therefore, our analysis is in line with tradition in Social Choice Theory analyzing
the existence of domain restrictions from which strategy-proof mechanisms can be
designed. In particular, we concentrate on the possibility of identifying a restric-
tion of students’ preferences under which the SOCE is immune to manipulation
by the students.
To clarify how manipulability can be prevented, the following examples illus-
trate the limits of the agents’ manipulation.
Example 20 Benefiting from a loss and the SOCE manipulation
Let us consider the three-students-three-schools problem, P , where S = {1, 2, 3},
C = {a, b, c}, and each school quota is qj = 1. The students’ preferences and
colleges’ priorities are
a 1 b 1 c
b 2 a 2 c
b 3 c 3 a
3 Pa 2 Pa 1
1 Pb 3 Pb 2
2 Pc 1 Pc 3
In such a case the application of the SOCE mechanism yields matching µce (P)
described as
µce (P) := 1 2 3
a b c
.
Since students 1 and 2 obtain a place at their preferred schools, they cannot
manipulate the SOCE at this problem. Nevertheless, when student 3 reports pref-
erences ′3, with b ′3 a ′3 c, the application of the SOCE yields matching
µce (P ′) described as
µce (P ′) := 1 2 3
a c b
.
Note that µce (3;P ′) = b 3 c = µce (3;P). This implies that 3 can manipu-
late the SOCE at P via ′3.
17
Let us observe that when applying the SOSM to the two examples above we
have that µSO (3;P) = c 3 a = µSO (3;P ′). The intuition behind this exam-
ple suggests the following possible approach for avoiding misrepresentation. Let
us imagine that student si modifies her preferences such that, during the SOSM
phase, she receives a place at ch′ , when she was matched to ch when truthfully
reporting her preferences. If all of the places that si prefers (when manipulating
preferences) to ch′ are truthfully worse than ch, this agent will never benefit from
misrepresenting her preferences.
The example above suggests that, to avoid manipulability of the SOCE, no
student should be able to exhibit two different preferences having the same best
school. Nevertheless, this is not the only option that an student might have to
manipulate the SOCE. It is well known that the SOSM mechanism fail to satisfy
non-bossiness, i.e. an agent can influence on her rivals’ allocation keeping the
same place assigned to her. Example 21 points out that this fact can be used by an
student to manipulate the SOCE.
Example 21 Let us consider the following instance. S := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, C :=
{a, b, c, d, e, f} with qj = 1 for each j. Students’ preferences and schools priori-
ties are9
a 1 b 1 · · ·
a 2 c 2 d 2 · · ·
d 3 e 3 · · ·
a 4 c 4 · · ·
d 5 c 5 f 5 · · ·
b 6 f 6 a 6 · · ·
6 Pa 2 Pa 4 Pa 1 Pa · · ·
1 Pb 6 Pb · · ·
4 Pc 5 Pc 2 Pc · · ·
2 Pd 3 Pd 5 Pd · · ·
3 Pe · · ·
5 Pf 6 Pf · · ·
In such a case, the SOSM yields matching
µSO (P) := 1 2 3 4 5 6
b d e c f a
.
9In the following description dots inform that the remaining elements -students or schools-
can be placed in any position before the listed ones.
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Now, let us consider the alternative preferences for student 2 described as
c ′2 d ′2 a ′2 . . .
The SOSM associates to the new problem, namely P ′, matching
µSO (P ′) := 1 2 3 4 5 6
b d e a c f
.
Let us observe that student 2’s misrepresentation modifies the allocations by
students 4, 5 and 6 when applying the SOSM. Moreover, if we analyze the conse-
quences of such modifications when SOCE is employed, we have that µce (2,P ′) =
c 2 d = µce (2,P); i.e. student 2 manipulates the SOCE at P via ′2.
To introduce the β-condition we require some additional notation. Let us con-
sider a set of three schools, namely C ′ = {a, b, c}, and one student, say si, with
preferencesi. We denote byM (C ′,i) the median school on C ′ accordinglyi;
i.e. b = M (C ′,i) if either a i b i c or c i b i a. Similarly, W (C ′,i)
denotes the worst school on C ′ accordingly i; i.e. c = W (C ′,i) if a i c and
b i c.
Definition 22 The β-Condition
For a given student, say si, let Ωi denote her set of admissible preferences. We
say that Ωi satisfies the β-Condition if for each two preferences i and ′i in
Ωi and any three-school set C ′, either M (C ′,i) = M (C ′,′i) or W (C ′,i) =
W (C ′,′i)
We can now establish the next result, whose formal proof is gathered to Ap-
pendix D.
Theorem 23 Let us assume that, associated with each student si, there is a set of
preferences Ωi satisfying the β-Condition. Then, the SOCE rule is strategy-proof
when each student is required to declare preferences in Ωi.
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6. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an alternative approach to circumventing the efficiency-equity
dilemma present in the School Choice problem. We propose an alternative inter-
pretation of the legitimacy of an agent’s claims against the equity of an allocation.
We achieve our objective by employing a weak notion of envy-freeness, which we
call λ-equity. This notion requires that any objection to a proposal by the District
School Board be disregarded whenever it might be counter-objected. One of the
most relevant properties exhibited by this equity criterion is that it is not incompat-
ible with the efficiency requirement. Therefore, it becomes interesting to explore
the structure of the set of allocations satisfying both equity (in a weak sense) and
efficiency. We call this set of allocations the τ -fair set, and it is characterized as
the set of efficient allocations Pareto-improving on the SOSM. As a byproduct,
we identify a simple, natural method, we call SOCE, to compute a τ -fair alloca-
tion. This rule has a familiar flavor and can be implemented through a minimal
reform of certain schooling systems, such as the procedure recently adopted in the
Boston area. Loosely, the SOCE can be described as if students were allowed to
exchange the places allocated to them in the actual system.
A further question that we address relates to the agents’ strategic behavior
when the SOCE mechanism is adopted. As Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) claim,
strategy-proofness is a crucial property for the survival of an allocation system.
Therefore, the (theoretical) manipulability of the SOCE might be regarded as an
inconvenience in terms of the practical implementation of this rule. Nevertheless,
as we note, in real-life situations, one might expect that no student benefits from
strategic behavior. The reason is that, as stated in Theorem 23, the mechanism is
manipulable only if agents are allowed to select preferences from a set not fulfill-
ing the β condition. This domain restriction captures, among other possibilities,
the case in which students’ preferences are highly correlated, as is likely according
to Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011).
Concerning the real-live adoption of the SOCE, we wish to stress that there
are allocation mechanisms, employed in similar frameworks, in which agents are
allowed to improve on their initial allocations by exchanging their rights. This
evidence is abundant concerning both the civil service and the army. For instance,
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civil servants are allowed to exchange their placements in Spain,10 and a resem-
bling exchange can be performed in the US Army under the so-called Enlisted As-
signment Exchanges (SWAPS).11 Similar systems, in which agents can exchange
goods that they do not own, but for which they retain some rights, can be found
in some socially accepted systems, such as several international student exchange
programs or a recent kidney exchange12 program. Additionally, our procedure
shares some features with the proposals advanced by the Ecole Démocratique to
reform the actual system in the French-speaking area of Belgium.13
To conclude, let us mention that Theorem 23 is not only valid for the SOCE,
but also for any Student Optimal Placing Market mechanism, i.e., mechanisms as
described in Definition 14, in which condition (2.c) in the description of exchange
preferences are not required. To clarify this point, let us mention that our proof of
Theorem 23 does not require that such a condition be satisfied. This observation
suggests that the question about the maximal domain restriction under which the
SOCE is strategy-proof is still an open question that deserves the attention of
future research.
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APPENDIX
A. A Proof of Theorem 11
This appendix introduces a formal proof of Theorem 11, which characterizes the
set of τ -fair allocations associated with each specific School Choice problem. Re-
call that our result establishes that matching µ is τ -fair if it satisfies two properties.
The first is Pareto efficiency, which is also required by Definition 8; the second is
that each student (weakly) prefers the place that µ assigns to her rather than the
place suggested by the SOSM,
µ (si) %i µSO (si;P) . (1)
Proof of Theorem 11
Let P = (;P ) be a Problem, and let µ be a matching. We first show that if
µ is τ -fair, then it satisfies condition (1). Note that by Definition 8, µ should be
efficient.
To achieve our objective, let us assume by way of contradiction that µ does
not satisfy condition (1). There should be a student si, such that
µSO (si;P) i µ (si) . (2)
Let us observe that, for each si satisfying condition (2) above, the τ -fairness
of µ implies that there is cj ∈ C such that cj = µSO (si;P). Moreover, such a
college satisfies that
(1) sh Pj si, for each sh in µ (cj), and
(2)
∣∣µSO (cj;P)∣∣ = qj .
Taking into account that the number of schools is finite, there is an (ordered) set
of students {st}Tt=1, with T ≤ m, and schools {ct}Tt=1 such that, for each t
(a) µ (st) = ct,
(b) µSO (st;P) = ct+1, with T + 1 = 1, and
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(c) ct+1 st ct.
Now, let us consider matching µ′′ such that
(i) For each st ∈ {st}Tt=1, µ′′ (st) = ct+1 (modulo T ), and
(ii) For each si /∈ {st}Tt=1, µ′′ (si) = µ (si).
It is easy to verify that µ′′ Pareto-dominates µ, which contradicts our hypothesis.
Now, let us assume that µ is an efficient allocation that satisfies condition (1).
We will see that µ is τ -fair.
To reach a contradiction, let us assume that µ is not τ -fair. Then, as µ is effi-
cient, there should be a student-matching pair, (si, µ′), that constitutes a justified,
fair objection to µ.
Therefore, by Definition 4 and condition (1), we note that
µ′ (si) i µ (si) %i µSO (si;P) . (3)
Note that this relationship implies that µ′ (si) ∈ C. Let cj denote such a school.
From Martínez et al. (2001), we know that for any matching µˆ, if µˆ (si) i
µSO (si;P) for some student, si, then µˆ is not equitable. In particular, this implies
that matching µ′ fails to be equitable. Then, there should be a student, sh, and a
school, ck, such that
(1) ck h µ′ (sh), and
(2) sh Pk sl for some sl 6= sh, or |µ′ (ck)| < qk.
Therefore, if we consider any matching µ′′, such that µ′′ (sh) = ck, the pair
(sh, µ
′′) describes a counter objection from student sh to (si, µ′), which contra-
dicts the hypothesis that µ fails to be τ -fair.  
B. The SOCE: An Example
This appendix provides an example illustrating how to compute the SOCE.
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Let us consider the following School Choice problem. S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};
C = {a, b, c, d}; the capacity for each school is 2; and the students’ preferences
and schools’ priorities are
b 1 a 1 c 1 d
c 2 a 2 d 2 b
c 3 b 3 a 3 d
d 4 b 4 c 4 a
a 5 c 5 d 5 b
a 6 b 6 c 6 d
a 7 b 7 d 7 c
b 8 a 8 c 8 d
; and
4 Pa 1 Pa 2 Pa 6 Pa 8 Pa 7 Pa 5 Pa 3
3 Pb 2 Pb 7 Pb 6 Pb 4 Pb 1 Pb 8 Pb 5
7 Pc 5 Pc 6 Pc 8 Pc 2 Pc 3 Pc 1 Pc 4
5 Pd 6 Pd 3 Pd 4 Pd 2 Pd 8 Pd 7 Pd 1
The SOSM
As shown in Table 1, the SOSM proposes to allocate a place in school a to students
1 and 2; students 3 and 7 are accepted by school b; students 5 and 6 are placed
at school c; and, finally, students 4 and 8 will attend school d. A column in the
table is devoted to each school. A row indicates the applications that each school
receives at this step. The students framed in a box are those whose applications
are refused, whereas the remaining students are tentatively accepted by the school.
The Student Optimal Compensating Market
As we mention in Section 4, a Placing Market is determined by the set of students,
S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, and a preference profile, E , denoting, for each student,
how she orders her “rivals” depending on her initial assignment, µSO. We inter-
pret the preferences determined by a student as her inclination to exchange the
place that µSO assigns to her with the other students. The construction of these
preferences is guided by the following two principles.
(a) A student participates in this market if she obtains a positive net profit from
the exchange; and
(b) a student, when exchanging, tries to maximize her utility (i.e., she attempts
to secure a place at the best school, according to her opinion of the educa-
tional institutions).
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Step a b c d
1 5 , 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3 4
2 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3 , 5 4
3 6, 7 1, 3, 8 2, 5 4
4 6, 7 , 8 1, 3 2, 5 4
5 6, 8 1 , 3, 7 2, 5 4
6 1, 6, 8 3, 7 2, 5 4
7 1, 6 3, 7 2 , 5, 8 4
8 1, 2, 6 3, 7 5, 8 4
9 1, 2 3, 6 , 7 5, 8 4
10 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6, 8 4
11 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4 , 8
µSO = 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4 , 8
Table 1: The SOSM.
In the case of SOCE, a student orders two agents, other than her, who have been
assigned the same school by “reversing the school ordering” proposed by the pri-
ority lists.
To illustrate how to compute the students’ preferences for exchanging, E , we
will concentrate on student 6. The process is as follows
(1) Provided that her preferred school is a, and µSO (a;P) = {1, 2}, we note
that her two “tops for exchanging” are students 1 and 2. Moreover, as 1 Pa 2,
we have that
2 E6 1.
(2) Now, the second school in student 6’s preference list is b, the available
28
places of which have been assigned to students 3 and 7. We note that these
students will be placed in the third and fourth positions according to E6. As
3 Pb 7, it follows that
7 E6 3.
(3) The third school in student 6’s preference list is c, and µSO (c;P) = {5, 6},
Principle (a) above indicates that
6 E6 5.
For our purposes, once student 6 has established her own position on E6, we
do not need to continue describing how the remaining students are ordered.
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we will also explain how E6
orders students 4 and 8.
(4) µSO (4;P) = µSO (8;P) = d, and 4 Pd 8. Therefore,
8 E6 4.
Summarizing, the preferences for exchange exhibited by student 6 are
2 E6 1 E6 7 E6 3 E6 6 E6 5 E6 8 E6 4,
or, equivalently,
E6 := 2, 1, 7, 3, 6, 5, 8, 4.
Applying a similar argument to the remaining students, we can compute E , the
description of which is
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E1 := 7, 3, 1, 2, 6, 5, 8, 4
E2 := 6, 5, 2, 1, 8, 4, 7, 3
E3 := 6, 5, 3, 7, 2, 1, 8, 4
E4 := 4, 8, 7, 3, 6, 5, 2, 1
E5 := 2, 1, 5, 6, 8, 4, 7, 3
E6 := 2, 1, 7, 3, 6, 5, 8, 4
E7 := 2, 1, 7, 3, 8, 4, 6, 5
E8 := 7, 3, 6, 5, 8, 4, 2, 1
Therefore, SOCM (P) = (S, E), where S = {1, . . . , 8} is the set of students
and E is the preference profile described above.
The Tops Trading Cycle Rule
To continue with our illustrative example, we now compute the outcome of the
TTC rule when applied to the Student Optimal Compensating Market that was
previously described.
Step 1. At the first step, the set of students is S. To draw the next digraph, we
proceed as follows. A node is assigned to each student. We draw an arc
connecting si to sh if the latter is the top for Ei.14
1 2
3
7
5 4
6
8
Figure 1: TTC algorithm, first step.
Let us observe that the above digraph contains two cycles; the first includes
students 2 and 6, and the second only contains student 4. Therefore, these
14For instance, as 7 is the top for E1, we draw an arc that departs from 1 and is incident to 7.
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three students exit the market, and we can describe a “new market” that
includes students S2 = {1, 3, 5, 7, 8}.
Step 2. At the second step, the set of students is S2 described above. We proceed in
a similar manner to that explained in the previous step and draw its corre-
sponding directed graph.
1
3
7
5 8
Figure 2: TTC algorithm, second step.
There is clearly a cycle involving students 1 and 7. Therefore, K (S2) = {1, 7},
and both students exit the market, allowing us to consider the residual market
S3 = {3, 5, 8}.
Step 3. In this step, the set of remaining students is S3. It is easy to see that there
one cycle containing student 5. Therefore, K (S3) = {5} and S4 = {3, 8}.
Step 4. Now student 3 forms a cycle, and hence K (S4) = {3} and S5 = {8}.
Step 5. Since S5 is a singleton, we note that K (S5) = {8} and S6 = ∅. As each
student is, at this point, involved in some cycle, the algorithm stops.
Therefore, the outcome of the Tops Trading Cycle, applied to SOCM (P), is
si 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TTC (si; (S, E)) 7 6 3 4 5 2 1 8
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The Compensating Exchange mechanism
To conclude the process, we must move from the initial matching µSO (P) to the
matching that results from the exchange of places suggested by the Tops Trading
Cycle rule. For instance, as TTC (1) = 7, then
µce (1;P) = µSO (7;P) = b.
Therefore, the outcome of the SOCE for this example is
si 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
µce (si;P) b c b d c a a d
C. A Proof for Theorem 17
To prove Theorem 17, let us consider a School Allocation problem, P = (;P ),
and let µSO (P) be its student optimal stable matching.
Let us observe that when describing the Student Optimal Compensating Mar-
ket, the preferences for exchange held by a student, si, such that µSO (si;P) 6= si,
verify that for any other student sh,
sh Ei si ⇒ µSO (sh;P) i µSO (si;P) .
By construction, the Tops Trading Cycle satisfies the requirement that, for each
Placing Market, (S, P ), and any si ∈ S such that TTC (si; (S, E)) 6= si,
TTC (si; (S, E)) Ei si.
This implies that for each student, si,
µce (si;P) %i µSO (si;P) . (4)
As µSO (P) is equitable, we note the following.
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(a) If for some student, si, µSO (si;P) = si, then (, P ) satisfies that
n >
m∑
j=1
qj , and
(b) If there is some school, cj , that has vacancies at µSO (P), i.e.,∣∣µSO (cj;P)∣∣ < qj ,
then for each student, si,
µSO (si;P) %i cj .
To complete our proof, let us assume that µce (P) is not τ -fair. Taking into ac-
count equation (4) and Theorem 11, we note that µce (P) should not be efficient.
Therefore, there should be a matching, µ, such that for each student, si,∈ S
µ (si) %i µce (si;P) , and
there should be a student, sh, such that
µ (sh) h µce (sh;P) . (5)
Let S denote the set of students fulfilling Condition (5). By condition (4) and
because µSO is equitable, we note that for each si ∈ S, there is another student,
sh, in S such that µ (si) = µce (sh;P). This finding implies that si’s preferences
for exchange satisfy the requirement that
sh Ei TTC (si;SOCM (P)) . (6)
To obtain a contradiction, for each student si ∈ S, we let t (si) denote the stage
at which it is determined TTC (si;SOCM (P)). Without loss of generality, let us
assume that si ∈ S is such that t (si) ≤ t (sk) for each sk ∈ S. By condition (5),
we note that in the digraph for stage t (si), there is no arc from si to µce (si;P).
This finding constitutes a contradiction, which indicates that there is no match-
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ing, µ, Pareto-dominating µce (P).  
D. A Proof of Theorem 23
To prove Theorem 23, let us consider a problem P ≡ (;P ), a student si ∈ S and
preferences for si, ′i. Let P ′ ≡ ((′i,−i) ;P ) be the problem obtained from P
by replacing si’s preferences.
Let us assume that si manipulates the SOCE rule at P via′i. We will see that
any set of preferences for si containing i and ′i fails to satisfy the β-condition.
Note that if µSO (si;P) = si 6= µSO (si;P ′), we have that µSO (si;P ′) i
µSO (si;P). This contradicts the non-manipulability of the SOSM (see, v.g., Roth,
1982). Therefore, since si manipulates, she is assigned a place in each matchings.
Let us remark the following three facts.
Fact 1. The manipulation hypothesis implies that µce (si;P ′) i µce (si;P);
Fact 2. by construction, we have that µce (si;P) %i µSO (si;P); and
Fact 3. since SOSM is strategy-proof, µSO (si;P) %i µSO (si;P ′).
Now, let us consider the following two cases, which exhaust all the possibilities.
Case 1. µSO (si;P) i µSO (si;P ′). Note that, this implies that µSO (si;P ′) ′i
µSO (si;P). By facts 1 and 2, and transitivity we have that
µce (si;P ′) i µSO (si;P) i µSO (si;P ′) ; (7)
facts 1 and 3 imply that µce (si;P ′) 6= µSO (si;P ′). Therefore, by construc-
tion, we have that µce (si;P ′) ′i µSO (si;P ′). Transitivity yields that
µce (si;P ′) ′i µSO (si;P ′) i µSO (si;P) . (8)
Note that conditions (7) and (8) indicate that this agent admissible prefer-
ences fail to satisfy the β-condition.
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Case 2. µSO (si;P) = µSO (si;P ′). By fact 1, there should be some school cj such
that
cj i µSO (si;P) , and µSO (si;P) ′i cj . (9)
Note that, otherwise, µSO (P) = µSO (P ′). Therefore, since the TTC is
non-manipulable, µce (P) %i µce (P ′). Contradicting fact 1.
Therefore, since µce (si;P ′) 6= µSO (si;P), condition (9) implies that
µce (si;P ′) ′i µSO (si;P) ′i cj . (10)
To conclude, let us observe that conditions (9) and (10) are incompatible with the
fulfillment of the β-condition by si’ admissible preferences.
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